International Judicial Monitor
Published by the International Judicial Academy, Washington, D.C., with assistance from the
American Society of International Law

Spring 2015 Issue

EDITORIAL

 

About Judicial Qualifications, Judicial Backgrounds, and Judicial Appointments

Dr. James G. Apple

By: James G. Apple, Editor-in-Chief, International Judicial Monitor and President, International Judicial Academy

Recently a popular magazine in the United States (print version) that publishes articles on a variety of topics that are or should be of interest and concern to the general populace featured in its “Dispatches: Ideas and Provocations” section an excellent commentary about the Supreme Court of the United States. The article, written by Yale Law School professor Akhil Reed Amar, was somewhat unique in that this particular magazine, The Atlantic, and others similar to it, do not usually publish articles  about judges and courts in general, and about the Supreme Court in particular. The subject of the article was not about the Court’s decisions or its jurisprudence, but about the make-up of the Court, the backgrounds of the nine justices who make up the Court and the type of person they represent.

The use of the word “type” in the singular is intentional, because the article was about the lack of diversity among the current justices and the sameness of their backgrounds. Diversity here does not mean race or gender; there is one black justice and three women justices who sit on the current Court. The lack of diversity refers to their professional backgrounds. The discussion in the article centers around the important issue of what should a court reflect by way of professional background of its members.

The main thrust of the magazine article is that the justices who currently sit on the Supreme Court, all nine of them, have the same or similar backgrounds, as indicated below. The question arises: Is this a situation or characteristic of the Supreme Court good or healthy, or is it a distraction and one that is detrimental to the proper workings of the Court? There is a corollary to this question: is such a situation good for any appellate court in the United States and elsewhere in the world.

An even superficial examination of the backgrounds of the nine justices reveals the problem: all nine are graduates of “elite” colleges and elite law schools, particular those colleges and law schools in the “Ivy League.” There are only six colleges represented on the Court, all of the elite variety (Harvard, Princeton, Cornell, Stanford, Georgetown, and Holy Cross). With the exception of Stanford, located in California, all of the schools are located on the eastern seaboard. Only two law schools are represented on the Court, Harvard and Yale (although Justice Ruth Ginsberg started at Harvard and later transferred to Columbia). All members of the Court are former members of U.S. courts of appeal. Only one justice has had any kind of trial experience. Only of the justices has held a high ranking position in the executive or legislative branches of the federal government or state governments (Justice Elena Kagan served as Solicitor General of the United States. None have had any significant political experience.

One court watcher also noted another characteristic of the current Court. After the appointment of one member in 2006 (Justice Samuel Alito), there were justices who grew up in four of the five boroughs of the City of New York (a borough is a political subdivision of a city, much like a county is a subdivision of a state), while four of the remaining five justices grew up in large metropolitan areas or in the suburbs thereof. Truly rural areas are unrepresented.

The Atlantic article contrasts the make-up of the current Court with that of past Supreme Courts dating back to the early years of the United States in the last part of the 18th Century. An examination of the backgrounds of justices from early periods reveals a rich variety of pre-Court experiences among many of the justices, rather than sitting as an appellate judge, starting with the fourth Chief Justice John Marshall, generally referred to as the “Great Chief Justice.” Chief Justice Marshall was appointed to his position without ever serving as a judge in any court. He was an officer in the Continental Army in the U.S. Revolutionary Was, served in the Congress of the United States, and immediately before his appointment served as U.S. Secretary of State. Other justices, including those who are considered among the greatest justices, also reflect diverse backgrounds. Examples are: one Chief Justice was the governor of one of the largest states in the U.S. and never served as a judge before his appointment (Chief Justice Earl Warren); one justice was a practicing lawyer who practiced law continually up to the time of his appointment and who was known as the “Peoples’ Lawyer” (Justice Louis Brandeis) and another justice, who never attended college and only one year of a local law school became Attorney General of the United States (Justice Robert Jackson). All four of these men made exceptional contributions to the law of the United States.

The author of the magazine article posed the question: “Why you may ask is any of this a problem? Why would we want ex-senators – or-ex Cabinet members, or ex- governors, or other sorts of ex pols, for that matter - on our highest court?” He answered his own question thusly:

While a bench overloaded with ex-pols would be unfortunate, the Court would benefit from having at least one or two justices who know how Washington works at the highest levels, and who have seen up close how presidents actually think, how senators truly spend their days, how bills in fact move through Congress, and so on- in short one or two justices whose resumes resemble those of former Secretary of State John Marshall, Hugo Black and Robert Jackson. Think of it as portfolio diversification: The Court works best when its justices can bring different perspectives to bear on difficult legal issues. Constitutional law, done right, requires various tools and techniques of argumentation and analysis. No single technique works best across all constitutional questions that have ever reason or will eventually arise.

 

It is appropriate to paraphrase a question asked by Professor Amar in The Atlantic article: Why would we not want brilliant legal scholars who have graduated from the best colleges and best law schools to sit on the Supreme Court. A corollary question is: Why would we not want all of the justices to represent narrow geographical constituents or be associated with a relatively small geographical area within the very large fifty states of the United States.

The answer to the first question is that academic brilliance, especially legal academic brilliance, is no guarantee of correct judgments in the myriad of cases that come before the Supreme Court. Another way of answering that question is the same given by Professor Amar to his question: “simple portfolio diversification.”  Because cases coming before appellate judges involve a variety of subjects which may require different approaches for a well reasoned solution,  a supreme court or lower appellate court that is made up of judges from a diversity of backgrounds and geographical areas are more likely to arrive consistently at a correct or better judgment than if all of them have the same or similar backgrounds. This is especially true if individual judges have been exposed to a variety of life experiences which can be used and drawn upon in analyzing a particular legal problem. Professor Amar expressed this reasoning in his magazine article:

Constitutional interpretation, done right requires various tools and techniques of argumentation and analysis. No single technique works best across all constitutional questions that have ever arisen or will eventually arise. Some problems may be best considered through a combination of close textual analysis of a particular clause and holistic analysis of the Constitution’s overall structure. On other topics, the original intent behind the provision may be especially significant. Still other issues should be approached through the prism of prior case law. Sometimes however, text, structure, original intent and precedent may not cast much light on the legal issue at hand. In those cases, justices would be better off focusing on the relevant non judicial actors’ past institutional practices -  say, settlements and agreements between members of different political branches that effectively glossed ambiguous constitutional texts. Ex-attorneys general such as Robert Jackson and ex-senators such as Hugo Black may enrich the Court by brilliantly deploying tools and techniques of constitutional interpretation that lifelong judges may lack.

In response to the question raised earlier on the issue of geographical representation, judges raised in different parts of the United States, with different geographical characteristics and even different cultures, would tend to view certain types of constitutional questions from different but valid perspectives, from which the Court could benefit.

There is one other approach to the issue of the background of Supreme Court justices and also of lower appellate court that is worthy of comment. In December, 1921, Judge Benjamin Nathan Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals (later Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court) published a compendium of articles in one volume that were derived from a series of lectures he had delivered the year before at the Yale Law School. He titled the work The Nature of the Judicial Process. This volume, which over the years has garnered much acclaim and popularity in U.S. legal circles, sought to explain the different methods of analysis which judges can use in analyzing cases and arriving at a satisfactory resolution of the disputes in them. The methods and techniques that Judge Cardozo identified as judge’s tools in analyzing cases and drafting opinions are, identified in the order in which they were presented, as follows:

The method of philosophy

The method of history

The method of tradition

The method of sociology

The judge as legislator

Adherence to precedent

The subconscious element

Justice Cardozo offers a careful examination of each of these approaches to judicial interpretation.  Here we have an earlier expression of the same sentiments offered by Professor Amar in his magazine article about judges interpreting constitutions and statutes.

The message from this discussion is clear – a court should reflect diversity in educational background, professional experience, and geography so that they can collectively bring their different experiences and expertise to bear on  legal issues and problems in a case appropriate for an acceptable opinion and judgment. A second message is that the idea of different methods of “judicial process,” the nature of those methods should prompt the selection of judges whose personal education and professional experience should be broad and diverse resulting from exposure to different disciplines, so that the judges can understand and use philosophy, history, tradition, sociology, legislation, judicial precedent and psychology in deciding cases.

ASIl & International Judicial AcademyInternational Judicial Monitor
© 2015 – The International Judicial Academy
with assistance from the American Society of International Law.

Editor: James G. Apple.
IJM welcomes comments, suggestions, and submissions.
Please contact the IJM editor at ijaworld@verizon.net.