latter, at the ICC and ICTY. Only the president will serve full time, while others will be called when proceedings begin. That reflects the philosophy behind the institution – the new ‘Kosovo court’ as it is often referred to – is a significantly smaller operation than the other judicial institutions in town. The budget for the new institution is around 30 million Euros a year (around 32 million U.S. dollars), provided by the EU, and other contributing countries such as Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the U.S. That is but a fragment of the regular ICC budget, or ICTY during the height of its activity.

The Chief Prosecutor is an experienced American lawyer, David Schwendiman, who was appointed to serve following the departure of Clint Williamson. Schwendiman was Head of the Special War Crimes Department at the Prosecutor’s Office in Sarajevo, leading the office and conducting investigations into some of the most complex cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the ICTY did not deal with. In his few public appearances in his new role, Schwendiman has made clear that his office will not be politicized, that it will work tirelessly, and be driven by evidence and nothing else. Back in September, during a press conference, Schwendiman stated that he will do his job the same way he had always done it: “fairly, vigorously, and without fear or favor”.  

The low profile the institution has so far kept is likely to change as the process moves to the stage of indictments being issued, and arrests sought. So far, little is known about the number of potential indictments, or defendants, and the potential date for the start of any proceedings. However, much is going on behind the scenes. Rules of procedure and evidence are being developed, and the necessary infrastructure required for a functioning court and prosecution is being built. The staff is being hired, and many of them are seasoned professionals with rich experience in the former Yugoslavia, and The Hague.

The Defense Office has been established, and is the responsibility of the Registrar, who needs to make sure that a list of ‘Specialist Counsel’ is created, containing names of counsel eligible to practice before the Specialist Chambers. There is also a system of legal aid for representation of indigent or partially indigent accused persons. Other responsibilities of the Registrar include ensuring victim participation, and the detention functioning up to the highest standards.

The protection of witnesses is arguably the biggest challenge for the new Court and Prosecutor’s Office. Similar cases at the ICTY demonstrated just what kinds of pressures and threats witnesses, and especially insiders with detailed knowledge of the crimes, face when testifying in court. Protecting witnesses and their families from the dangers they face in a small, tight-knit Kosovar society, where perpetrators are potentially involved with organized crime networks, is incredibly difficult and will require immense support by states, primarily in the European Union.    

The new Court and Prosecutor’s Office is operating in a deeply politicized immediate environment, in Kosovo, and Serbia. Kosovo’s independence is furiously contested by Serbia which regards it as its own territory, one that is invaluable as the site of the 1389 Kosovo battle, when a Serb prince was defeated by the Ottoman forces, leading to 500 years of foreign rule. For a large part of Serbia’s population, that territory is crucial for its history, and holds a special place in their self-perception as a community. As such, Kosovo is incredibly powerful as a tool for nationalist mobilization in politics. At the same time, Kosovo, now recognized by 111 (out of 193) UN members, is led by President Hashim Thaci, who was himself a high-ranking KLA leader during the relevant period. That means that the investigation and subsequent trial(s) may be uncomfortable for him, to say the least. In that environment, it will take wisdom and skill by the principals of the new court to navigate those difficult circumstances where leaders on both sides, in Kosovo and Serbia, are likely to try to use it for their political gain. The court, after all, must not only conduct fair trials, but has to be perceived, by the two stakeholder communities, as doing so. For now, formal support has been given to the court in both Pristina and Belgrade, but how genuine that support is remains to be seen.    

This institution is a result of finding creative institutional solutions to address the impunity gap in Kosovo. These are challenging times for the fight against impunity, and the courts and tribunals are threatened by an apparent lack of interest and support for justice. The EU is troubled by Brexit, and the political circumstances in some of its member states, and the Union’s joint response to challenges such as the war in Syria, Yemen, the instability in North Africa, and increased numbers of refugees. The new U.S. administration has so far shown little interest, competence and strategic vision in dealing with responses to mass violations during times of war. All of those factors make for a challenging environment for the Specialist Chambers and Prosecutor’s Office, which they will have to successfully navigate in order to fulfill their mandate: to provide some justice to the victims of crimes perpetrated in the last period of Yugoslavia’s bloody demise.