Published
by the International Judicial Academy, Washington, D.C., with assistance
from the
American Society of International Law
Fall 2016/Winter 2017 Issue |
In this issue
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Special Report
Preparing a Court for the Aftermath of a Disaster
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By: Netta Squires, J.D., Senior Law and Policy Analyst, University of Maryland Center for Health and Homeland Security
There is no such thing as a disaster-free
zone. While no plan can guarantee avoiding destruction, injury, or even deaths
from a hurricane, flood, fire, or act of terrorism, the magnitude of a disaster
can be greatly minimized by developing a thorough plan. Courts and judges play
a central role in a functioning society. It is imperative, therefore, that even
during the worst of disasters that courts continue operating with as little
disruption as possible. Besides the cascade of delays in already overflowing
dockets that could ensue from a closed or malfunctioning court house, human
rights and due process issues may arise. As the gatekeepers of the rule of law,
judges and courts must maintain the ability to continue functioning amidst
chaos, and to maintain society’s trust in the judicial system.
There are numerous examples of devastating
manmade and natural disasters disrupting the court systems in the United
States. The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, closed down
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the U.S. District and
Bankruptcy Courts for the Southern District of New York. Shortly after, the
U.S. Supreme Court was closed down (for the first time since its opening in
1935) due to an anthrax contamination within the postal service. The Court,
however, was able to continue operating by hearing arguments in another
location.
Despite the vast increase in focus on
emergency preparedness in courts following September 11, Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita in 2005 caused unprecedented devastation across the gulf region, resulting
in the closing and relocation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit and the U.S. District Courts for the Eastern District of Louisiana and
the Southern District of Mississippi, as well as many other local courts.[1] Similar
manmade and natural disasters regularly occur worldwide.
To succeed in reopening rapidly after a
disaster, courts must implement an effective Continuity of Operations Plan (“COOP”)
and an Emergency Response Plan (“ERP”). These plans should be based on a
comprehensive and thorough risk assessment, be directed by court leadership,
and be routinely practiced by all.
In assessing the risk, a court must
consider an array of concerns such as its geographical location, the physical
design of courthouse, employee safety during a disaster, and how to manage
access to data and communications systems. The court should create policies
that balance safety and security requirements with public access. A basic method
to prioritize emergency-management needs assesses both the most likely and the
most injurious events that could disrupt the court’s mission and essential
function of administering justice.
For example, a category five hurricane in
the U.S., such as Hurricane Katrina, that causes severe devastation (arguably
partially natural and partly manmade) is considered a low-probability yet
high-consequence event. That means that although the event has a low
probability of occurring, the effects of the disaster have the potential to be
so grave that planning is necessary and COOP and ERP should be in place. A
category five hurricane in another country, however, may be rated quite
differently—as a high probability-high consequence event. That is because risk
assessment depends on numerous variables such as geographical location, population
density, infrastructure, preparedness, and response capabilities.
Assessing risk in Taiwan, for example,
would vary greatly from assessing risk in the U.S. According to a 2005 World
Bank report entitled Natural Disaster Hotspots A Global Risk Analysis ,
Taiwan was noted as “the most vulnerable [country] to natural hazards on Earth,”
and is also one of the most densely populated countries in the world. [2]
Additionally, deficient public policy and insufficient government action in
Taiwan, including lack of building codes or substandard construction, increases
that country’s vulnerability. When Taiwan was struck by the Chi-Chi earthquake
in September 1999, for example, many public buildings, including courthouses
and government offices, collapsed because of inadequate seismic construction.
The toll was worsened by the then-existing inadequate plans that resulted in inaccessibility
and isolation of the impacted area for weeks after the earthquake.
Risk usually is determined by discussions
among key court leaders. For planning purposes, determining the probability of
a damaging event occurring is more important than trying to narrow down the
specific type of event that might occur. Plans are living documents that must
be routinely updated and exercised. There are many good templates to follow.
However, it is necessary for each court to tailor the plan to its specific
needs and capabilities. Each court should have are an ERP and a COOP.
In broad terms, an ERP focuses on
preserving public and employee safety and security. It also addresses immediate
response practices as a disaster is actually occurring. For example, an ERP
would provide evacuation or shelter-in-place protocols in case of an active
shooter, fire, or tornado. Whereas a COOP is a comprehensive guide that
ensures continuity of the court’s primary mission essential functions during a
wide range of emergencies and disasters. While most courts already have some
form of an ERP, this is not the case when it comes to continuity plans. This
article, therefore, highlights some of the key components of a COOP including
creating leadership, setting up adequate communication and data backup,
prioritizing functions, and pre-designating alternate worksites.
A COOP requires consultation with all of
the court’s key internal stakeholders and a dialogue with external partners.
Usually, a COOP addresses situations that threaten the courthouse or
court-related functions. An effective COOP establishes practices and procedures
to quickly deploy pre-designated personnel, equipment, vital records, and
supporting hardware and software to an alternative site to sustain
organizational operations for up to 30 days.[3] Additionally, it describes the resumption of normal operations after the
emergency has ended.
Recently, COOP have addressed the impact
that a pandemic might have on normal court operations. In such a scenario, even
though the court itself might remain intact, regular activities could be
suspended for up to 90 days due to lack of personnel.[4] Jury duty,
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prisoner transportation, and mail delivery could be affected by quarantines or
sickness. In such a case, only certain parts of a COOP might be activated, such
as telework capabilities.
A solid COOP coordinates with
representatives from other justice-system sectors such as the district attorney
and public defender offices, bar associations, probation, and corrections. It
addresses areas in which these agencies intersect with the court. Additionally,
the planning process involves agents of law enforcement, emergency agencies,
and other government agencies (e.g., public health) involved in coordinating
community emergency preparedness.
Influential court leaders are crucial in
setting the tone for effective emergency management. For local courts, that
means the presiding or chief judge should emphasize the importance of emergency
planning. The chief judge should spearhead the participation of other judges
and court personnel by designating staff and other resources to the planning
process. In the post-9/11 period, for instance, New York’s Court of Appeals’ Chief
Judge Judith Kaye and Chief Administrative Judge Jonathan Lippman’s
inspirational court leadership united representatives from all of the court
community to work together to reopen the courts.[5] Similarly, at the request of
Chief Judge Carolyn Dineen King of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit,
that court held an emergency-planning workshop to better prepare
for the safety of those working and visiting the building.[6] Of course
court managers, clerks, and staff, also play important influential roles. They
are the most versed in the details of operations and logistics, so effective
execution of the plan depends on their continuous cooperation and directorship.
Cultivating leadership for when a disaster
is actually in the process of unfolding is also essential. A COOP
pre-designates a line of successors and specifies the scope of their authority
so that leadership continues when key decision-makers are unable to lead.
Communication is also key when a disaster
hits. There are three basic elements to communications planning: technology,
procedures, and security. First, it is imperative to provide essential
personnel with backup communications appliances, such as cellular phones and
handheld radios. Second, the plan needs to set forth procedures for which
information will be communicated, to whom, and by what method. For example, who
is responsible for notifying both internally and externally the public about
court closings and openings, telework protocols, alternative work sites, and
the like. After being notified by the courts, attorneys can notify litigants of
schedule and location changes in their cases. Jurors and potential jurors
should be notified whether their service will be required, and when and where
they should go. Similarly, witnesses should be updated on the status of the
courts.
Finally, routine systems of data backup
are necessary. This includes backing up computer systems to off-site locations
in the event that computers at the primary work site are damaged or
inaccessible. The plan should also devise redundant systems of evidence
documentation and storage. After Katrina, many cases were delayed or had to be
dismissed because of the absence of witnesses or evidence lost in the chaos.
Evidence in as many as 3,000 criminal cases pending before the court system was
lost, and many witnesses and victims left the city and did not return.[7]
In the same way
that pre-disaster planning examines priorities, post-disaster response
activities should concentrate on urgent matters—such as life safety, fair
treatment of prisoners and detainees, and communication with the court’s
constituency—before addressing important matters. It is up to each court to
identify and relate these urgent priorities before a disaster strikes.
Moreover, a court should prioritize its essential functions. Priority is based
on a combination of any statutory time requirements, importance to the court’s
mission during a disaster, and the period of time the court could operate
without performing that function. Prioritization of the essential functions
should be based on the staff essential to performing them, needs, and available
resources.
To reduce
post-disaster backlogs and, more importantly, to preserve fundamental human
rights, it is crucial to triage cases, and to handle postponements on a
case-by-case basis. Plans, policies and protocols should be put in place for
relocating prisoners and releasing suspects. During Katrina, for example,
insufficient planning resulted in many suspects being released because
they had been held for too long without charges filed against them.
An alternative
site should take into consideration not only spaces for chambers and hearings,
but also work space for displaced lawyers and other court related staff, who
will need access to computers, phones, and meeting rooms. Some incidents, such
as natural disasters, may cover a vast area. It is advised, therefore, to
designate alternate worksites at a lengthy distance from the regular work sites
to assure the court continues functioning. Additionally, the alternative site
can function as a central hub to reunify dislocated members of the bar and
their families, restore files and records, and reconnect clients with counsel.
As noted by the National
Center for State Courts, “The ability of courts to perform their statutory
mandates and ensure access to justice and the protection of liberties is
particularly crucial when society’s traditional standards of operation are in
disarray.”[8] Worldwide, courts in disaster areas face extensive challenges. Disasters like
9/11 and the Chi Chi earthquake remind us that catastrophic disasters, which
are disasters that seriously overburden a community’s resources to recover, can
disrupt the courts for several days or even months. Planning for disasters of
such magnitude is a form of mitigation, and can greatly decrease the disruption.
In the United States, judges are becoming increasingly more engaged with
matters concerning the court’s security, emergency preparedness, and continuity
planning. This trend should be mirrored worldwide.
It is said in the
emergency management community that the best time to implement mitigation plans
is post disaster, when communities are forced to engage because of the
disaster’s impact and because of fear. Do not to wait for
that day. Take a leadership position in your court. Review and revise your
court’s current plan if there is one, or create a plan and practice it. Make
your court more resilient and better prepared to uphold justice throughout any
crisis.
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[1] Thomas A. Birkland, Emergency Planning and the Judiciary: Lessons from September 11 (2004).
[2] Yi-En Tso &
David A. McEntire, Emergency Management in Taiwan: Learning from Past and
Current Experiences, in Comparative
Emergency Management: Understanding Disaster Policies, Organizations, and
Initiatives from Around the World 1 (David McEntire 2011).
[3] See, e.g,, National Center for State Courts, Continuity of Court Operations: Steps for COOP
Planning, 5-6 (Dec. 2010).
[4] Thomas A.
Birkland & Carrie A. Schneider, Emergency Management in the Courts: Trends
After September 11 and Hurricane Katrina, Just. Sys.
J., 22 (2008).
[5] Id. at
27.
[6] Id. at 26.
[7] R. Crowe, One
Year Later: Big Easy’s Court System Still in State of Emergency; Judge Looking
at Releasing Some Prisoners Jailed Before Katrina but Still Not Charged, Houston Chronicle, Aug. 27,
2006, at A19.
[8] National Center for State Courts, supra note 3. |
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International
Judicial Monitor
© 2017 – The International Judicial Academy
with assistance
from the American Society of International Law.
Editor: James G. Apple.
IJM welcomes comments, suggestions, and submissions.
Please contact the IJM editor at ijaworld@verizon.net. |
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