U.S. v. Canada (London Court of International Arbitration, Feb. 23, 2009)

Click here for document (approximately 149 pages)

The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) has ruled in favor of the U.S., holding that Canada had breached the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) with the U.S. because it failed to calculate quotas properly between January and June 2007. As a result, the Court ordered that Canada remedy the breach within 30 days, and that Eastern provinces of Canada pay an additional 10% duty on lumber exports to the U.S., until C$68.26 million has accumulated.

The SLA Agreement came into force on October 12, 2006, and sets out the guidelines pertaining to trade in softwood lumber between the U.S. and Canada. The Agreement also specifies the method in which possible disputes among the parties will be settled. According to the Agreement, the settlement of disputes will take place according to the LCIA Rules.

The agreement states that Canada will apply export measures to exports of softwood lumber from softwood lumber producing regions of Canada to the United States when the price of lumber is below U.S. $355 per thousand board feet. On the other hand, the United States agreed not to initiate trade remedies proceedings or take other actions that would restrict trade in softwood lumber products from Canada, to revoke the countervailing and antidumping duty orders that had been in place for five years, and to return the estimated duties it had collected over that period on Canadian softwood lumber imports.

Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon (5th Cir. March 5, 2009)

Click here for document (approximately 16 pages)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that “[i]n the light of the Supreme Court’s clear language that, under the FAA [Federal Arbitration Act], the statutory provisions are the exclusive grounds for vacatur, manifest disregard of the law as an independent, nonstatutory ground for setting aside an award must be abandoned and rejected.”

According to the facts of the case, an arbitration panel ordered Citigroup to pay plaintiff Debra Bacon $256,000 for losses she suffered when her husband through forgery withdrew funds from her Citigroup Individual Retirement Accounts. Upon discovery of the fraud, Bacon submitted a claim in arbitration against Citigroup seeking reimbursement for the unauthorized withdrawals. She was granted $218,000 in damages and $38,000 in attorneys’ fees by the arbitration panel. Relying on § 10 of the FAA, Citigroup asked the court to vacate the award. The district court sided with Citigroup and vacated the judgment on the basis that the arbitrators had manifestly disregarded the law. The Court of Appeals had to determine whether manifest disregard of the law “remains a valid ground for vacatur of an arbitration award in the light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1396, 1403 (2008).”

According to the lower court, the following three factors led to the conclusion that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: “1) Bacon was not harmed by the withdrawals because her husband used the money for her benefit and subsequently promised to pay her back; 2) Bacon’s claims were barred by Texas law, which permits such claims only if the customer reports the unauthorized transaction within thirty days of the withdrawal; and 3) Texas law requires apportionment among the liable parties, which, in this case, includes Bacon’s husband.”

In finding for Bacon, the Court of Appeals noted that the “notion that arbitration awards should generally be upheld barring some sort of procedural injustice” was embraced by both the Congress and the courts. Only in a limited number of circumstances, which are enumerated in §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA, will an award be “vacated, modified, or corrected when the action is one brought under the Act.” Citing Hall, the Court found that “§§ 10 and 11 provide the exclusive regimes for review under the FAA,” and since the ground on which the lower court vacated the arbitral award was not mentioned in those sections, the decision to vacate the award was in error.

At first glance this case appears to deal only with domestic legal issues. But since the FAA sets out guidelines relating to the relationship between U.S. courts and arbitral awards, a decision wherein a U.S. court upholds an arbitral award despite possible disregard of the law by the arbitration tribunal, has both national and international significance.

Basardh v. Bush (D.D.C. March 31, 2009)

Click here for District Court decision (approximately 1 page); click here for the earlier Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decision (approximately 9 pages)

United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the habeas corpus petition filed by Yasin Muhammed Basardh, a national of Yemen currently detained in Guantanamo Bay, and ordered the government “to take all necessary and appropriate diplomatic steps to facilitate the release of [the] petitioner.”

On November 4, 2008, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the government’s motion to hold Basardh’s petition, seeking direct review of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal’s determination of his enemy combatant status, filed pursuant to Detainee Treatment Act § 1005(e)(2), in abeyance pending the conclusion of Basardh’s habeas proceedings in the district court. The Court of Appeals held that “there is a high probability that a consequence of Boumediene’s striking down the legislative bar against habeas jurisdiction is that the direct judicial review provision of the Detainee Treatment Act fell as well.”

El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. U.S. (D.C. Cir. March 27, 2009)

Click here for document (approximately 26 pages)

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the pharmaceutical company’s claims stemming from a 1998 missile strike ordered by then President Clinton on the suspicion that the plant was “connected to the terrorist activities of Osama bin Laden.” The Court held that the claim presented a nonjusticiable political question.

According to the decision, the facts are as follows: In August 1998, a terrorist network led by Osama bin Laden bombed two American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. As a response, President Clinton ordered a missile strike against the plaintiffs’ pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. The plaintiffs sued the United States, “challenging several allegedly defamatory statements made by senior executive branch officials justifying the strike as well as the government’s failure to compensate them for the destruction of the plant.” While the President, supported by high ranking officials, justified his actions, plaintiffs claimed that “the Clinton Administration was wrong on all counts about its justifications for striking the plant.” Eventually the Administration “learned that their initial justifications for the attack were false, at which time the Clinton Administration officials offered a new explanation that portrayed Idris, the actual owner of the plant, as a friend and supporter of terrorists.”

Plaintiffs lodged several unsuccessful suits against the government, seeking at least $50 million in damages for the government’s actions. First, they commenced an action in the United States Court of Federal Claims “seeking $50 million as just compensation under the Takings Clause of the Constitution.” However, the court dismissed the suit as nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. In addition, plaintiffs filed an administrative claim with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), “seeking compensation for the destruction of the plant as well as a retraction of the allegedly defamatory statements about El-Shifa and Idris.” The CIA denied the plaintiffs’ claim, whereupon plaintiffs commenced this case against the United States under the FTCA “seeking at least $50 million in damages for the government’s alleged negligence and trespass in carrying out the attack.” In addition to the FTCA action, plaintiffs also “sought declaratory judgments that the statements linking them to ‘Osama bin Laden, international terrorist organizations and the production of chemical weapons’ were false and that the government’s refusal to compensate them for the attack violated the law of nations.” The government filed a motion to dismiss and the district court agreed, holding that the court “lack[ed] . . . subject matter jurisdiction,” to hear the case and that the claim ‘“likely present[ed] a nonjusticiable political question.’” The plaintiffs then filed this appeal, “challeng[ing] only the dismissal of their claims for equitable relief for defamation and under the law of nations.”

The Court sided with the government, holding that “courts are not a forum for second-guessing the merits of foreign policy and national security decisions textually committed to the political branches.” And while “plaintiffs attempt to distance their law of nations and defamation claims from the nonjusticiable question of why the President ordered the missile strike, both claims nonetheless present questions ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the underlying decision to attack the El-Shifa pharmaceutical plant” (italics added).

King v. Cessna Aircraft (11th Cir. March 27, 2009)

Click here for document (approximately 19 pages)

The plaintiffs are personal representatives of individuals killed as a result of an airplane accident that occurred in Italy in 2001. All but the King family (King plaintiffs), personal representatives of Jessica King, a U.S. citizen, are Europeans. King plaintiffs filed a complaint against Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) in the Southern District of Florida. The 69 European plaintiffs also instituted an action against Cessna, and the two cases were eventually consolidated.

In 2005, the district court granted in part Cessna’s motion to dismiss the European plaintiffs’ complaint on forum non conveniens grounds, denied the motion to dismiss with respect to the King plaintiffs, but stayed that case pending resolution of Italian disputes relating to the European plaintiffs. All plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals vacated the lower court’s decision and remanded, “instruct[ing] the district court to consider whether, knowing ‘it could not avoid dual proceedings by staying the King case, it might have dismissed all of the plaintiffs, including King, or allowed all of the plaintiffs to proceed here, or perhaps pursued some other avenue.’”. The lower court again dismissed the European plaintiffs and allowed the King plaintiffs to proceed “for the reasons it previously gave.”

On this second appeal, the European Plaintiffs argued that “majority of them are from countries having bilateral treaties with the United States that accord them ‘no less favorable’ access to U.S. courts to redress injuries caused by American actors.” However, the Court of Appeals rejected this broad interpretation of treaty language, holding instead that “the lesser deference given by the district court to the European Plaintiffs’ choice of forum was consistent with the treaty obligations of the United States. Just as it would be less reasonable to presume an American citizen living abroad would choose an American forum for convenience, so too can we presume a foreign plaintiff does not choose to litigate in the United States for convenience.”

Fadi al Maqaleh v. Gates (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2009)

Click here for document (approximately 53 pages)

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that detainees imprisoned at the U.S. Air Base in Bagram, Afghanistan can challenge the legality of their detention before a federal judge in a U.S. court, based on Boumediene v. Bush (2008). By comparing the petitioners here to those in Boumediene, Judge Bates concluded that given the “citizenship, site of apprehension, and status -- the analysis for these petitioners is roughly the same as it was for the petitioners in Boumediene.” The Court rejected the government’s argument that applying the Boumediene standard to individuals held in Afghanistan “is tantamount to a holding that the Constitution ‘applies to the four corners of the earth.’” The Court disagreed with the government’s conclusion, noting instead that the “narrowly drawn” test in Boumediene only applies in cases where the U.S. has “the degree of control over a site that would permit meaningful review of an individual's detention following a ‘reasonable amount of time.’”

The four petitioners “are all foreign nationals captured outside Afghanistan yet held at the Bagram Theater Internment Facility at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan for six years or more” as enemy combatants by U.S. forces. The U.S. government filed a motion to dismiss their habeas corpus petitions on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction to review their status in the aftermath of Boumediene.

The case has received much attention, especially after the new administration informed the court that it ‘“adheres to its previously articulated position’” regarding the treatment of habeas petitions of alleged enemy combatants. Many did not anticipate that the new administration would agree with the Bush administration litigation position in this case, especially given President Obama’s criticisms of the Bush administration policy during campaign days.

In Re South African Apartheid Litigation (D.C.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2009)

Click here for document (approximately 144 pages)

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), alleging defendants’ multinational corporations aided and abetted the brutal apartheid regime in South Africa thus violating customary international law.

There are two classes of plaintiffs, the Ntsebeza and Khulumani, each alleging different types of violations. According to the Ntsebeza plaintiffs, Daimler, Ford, and GM [the automotive defendants] “committed both direct and secondary violations of law of nations by engaging in workplace discrimination that mimicked and enhanced apartheid.” The Ntsebeza plaintiffs also claim that the IBM [the technology defendants] “committed secondary violations of the law of nations by providing the computer hardware, software, maintenance, and support necessary for the South African government to carry out geographic segregation and denationalization.” Finally, according to the Ntsebeza plaintiffs, Barclays Bank [the banking defendants] “directly and indirectly violated the law of nations through its employment practices.”

The Khulumani plaintiffs also allege that the automotive defendants aided and abetted by providing automotive parts to the apartheid security forces; the technology defendants aided and abetted apartheid by providing software to track dissidents; and that the banking defendants violated the law of nations by financing the apartheid government. Finally, Khulumani plaintiffs also allege that Rheinmetall [military supply defendants] provided armaments and military equipment to the apartheid regime, thus aiding and abetting the South African government in violations of customary international law.

The two classes of plaintiffs originally filed their claim in 2002. However, the Southern District of New York court dismissed their actions, finding aiding and abetting unavailable under the ATCA. The 2nd Circuit reversed. Defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, but without a necessary quorum of six justices, the Supreme Court affirmed the 2nd Circuit, and the case returned to the District Court, where defendants filed the current motion to dismiss.

The District Court held that ATCA applies exterritorialy, thus disagreeing with the defendants’ argument that the ATCA should only apply within U.S. borders. The Court went on to hold that while state-sponsored apartheid was against customary international law, “this Court declines to recognize a tort of apartheid by a non-state actor.” The Court did allow the following claims to continue:

1) Ntsebeza plaintiffs v. Daimler, GM, and Ford, for aiding and abetting torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, extrajudicial killing, and apartheid

2) Ntsebeza plaintiffs v. IBM, for aiding and abetting arbitrary denationalization and apartheid

3) Khulumani plaintiffs v. Rheinmetall, for aiding and abetting extrajudicial killing and apartheid

All other claims were dismissed.

Gherebi v. Obama et al. (D.C.C. Apr. 22, 2009)

Click here for document (approximately 48 pages)

In a long awaited decision by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, regarding the government's authority to detain individuals suspected of supporting terrorist organizations, the Court “adopt[ed] the government’s standard for detention ... subject [only] to the interpretation of that standard provided by the Court.” Although the Court criticized the “ephemeral character” of the changes made by the current administration with respect to who may be detained – the new requirement is that the individual legally detainable must have “substantially” supported, rather than just supported the Taliban or al-Qaeda forces – it still held these changes to be in accordance “with the laws of war as the Court understands them.”

The Court held “as a matter of law that, in addition to the authority conferred upon him by the plain language of the AUMF, the President has the authority to detain persons who were part of, or substantially supported, the Taliban or al-Qaeda forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, provided that the terms 'substantially supported' and 'part of' are interpreted to encompass only individuals who were members of the enemy organization’s armed forces, as that term is intended under the laws of war, at the time of their capture.”

Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elah (U.S. Sup. Ct. Apr. 21, 2009)

Click here for document (approximately 33 pages)

The United States Supreme Court held that a judgment in favor of Iran could not be attached by Respondent Elahi, a U.S. national who successfully obtained an award against Iran for the death of his brother, because Respondent had waived his right to attach any Iranian assets when he agreed to receive partial compensation from the U.S. government.

Elahi, whose brother was allegedly murdered by Iran, sued Iran and successfully obtained a default judgment of about $312 million. Elahi then tried to collect parts of the judgment by attaching Iran’s assets, which were in the form of a judgment obtained by Iran against a California company (Cubic Judgment). Iran invoked the sovereign immunity defense of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, arguing that this prevented any such attachment. The defense was denied by the California District Court, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was an exception to the foreign sovereign immunity defense. The case then reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded, holding that the lower court’s reliance on the “commercial activity” exception was improper, because this exception “applies only to property of an ‘agency or instrumentality’ of a foreign state’”, not ‘property of an entity that itself is an inseparable part of the foreign state [Ministry of Defense].’” On remand, the Ninth Circuit found that a different type of exception applies, namely an exception enumerated in the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA). The TRIA exception “permit[s] holders of terrorism-related judgments against Iran to attach ‘blocked’ Iranian assets.”

After a lengthy discussion of the U.S.-Iran conflict and the subsequent unblocking of blocked assets, the Supreme Court held that “the asset still was not ‘blocked’ at the time of the decision below.” But even if the asset later was blocked, the Court added, “Elahi cannot attach the Cubic Judgment because he has waived his right to do so.” The Court cited Section 2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VPA) which “offers compensation to individuals holding terrorism-related judgments against Iran,” and “requires those receiving payment to relinquish ‘all rights to . . . attach property that is at issue in claims against the United States before an international tribunal.’” Since the U.S. government paid Elahi $2.3 million under the VPA as partial compensation for his judgment against Iran, and he signed a waiver form that mirrors the statutory language, Elahi could not seek to attach the property in question.

Republic of Iraq v. Beaty et al. (U.S. Supreme Court, June 8, 2009)

Click here for document (approximately 20 pages)

The United States Supreme Court held in Republic of Iraq v. Beaty et al., an action instituted by US nationals against Iraq for cruel mistreatment and abuse inflicted upon them or their relatives by the Saddam Hussein regime, that Iraq was immune to suits in US federal courts. According to the Court, although Iraq was once designated a sponsor of terrorism, and therefore initially stripped of its immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the Presidents's decision to waive the application of this section with respect to Iraq stripped the US courts of jurisdiction.

The Court concluded that “[w]hen the President exercised his authority to make inapplicable with respect to Iraq all provisions of law that apply to countries that have supported terrorism, the exception to foreign sovereign immunity for state sponsors of terrorism became inoperative as against Iraq. As a result, the courts below lacked jurisdiction.”

The Court dismissed the Respondents' argument that their claims should not be barred because the President's waiver took place after the conduct allegedly committed by Iraqi officials. According to the Court, “[l]aws that merely alter the rules of foreign sovereign immunity, rather than modify substantive rights, are not operating retroactively when applied to pending cases. Foreign sovereign immunity 'reflects current political realities and relationships,” and its availability (or lack thereof) generally is not something on which parties can rely 'in shaping their primary conduct.'”

Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited Summary Order, Settlement and other documents (2d. Cir. June 3, 2009)

Click here for original complaint (approximately 25 pages); click here for District Court SMJ decision to dismiss (approximately 24 pages); click here for 2d Cir. decision to remand (approximately 6 pages); click here for settlement agreement between Wiwa plaintiffs and Energy Equity Resources Limited Re Wiwa v. Shell Settlement (approximately 4 pages); click here for settlement agreement and mutual release (approximately 26 pages); click here for settlement and order (approximately 48 pages)

After a lengthy legal struggle between Nigerian plaintiffs and Shell, the two parties decided to settle their claims out of court, where Shell agreed to pay the plaintiffs, representatives of Nigerian human rights activists killed and tortured by individuals allegedly supported by the oil producer, a sum of $15.5 million.

The dispute began when the plaintiffs initiated suit in the US, invoking the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §10 1350, “alleging that ten of their Nigerian relatives were detained, tortured, and executed by SPDC [Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd.] directly and in concert with the Nigerian government, and with the knowledge of SPDC’s corporate parents, formerly known as Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and Trading Company (collectively ‘Royal Dutch/Shell’).”

The District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the claim for lack of personal jurisdiction on March 2, 2008. In addition, the lower court “denied jurisdictional discovery on the basis that the [plaintiffs] had access to the discovery previously conducted in related cases, which the court found to have been sufficient in scope to justify the dismissal.” On June 3, 2009, the 2nd Circuit vacated the lower court’s judgment and remanded for the district court “to reconsider its denial of jurisdictional discovery and dismissal of the action in light of the subsequent and continuing discovery in the related actions.” Only five days later, on June 8, 2009, the parties agreed to settle the case out of court.

The decision to settle out of court has received mixed responses, where some have applauded the substantial settlement obtained, and others have criticized the non-acceptance of responsibility by Shell and its subsidiaries.

Abdulrahim Abdul Razak Al Ginco v. Obama (June 22, 2009)

Click here for document (approximately 13 pages)

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia recently decided in a habeas corpus petition that the United States government had overstepped its detention authority in detaining the plaintiff, a Syrian national a.k.a. Janko, an alleged enemy combatant with links to al Qaeda and the Taliban. Judge Richard Leon critiqued the government’s claim that continued detention was necessary even though evidence presented demonstrated that the petitioner had severed his ties to al Qaeda and the Taliban, who had in fact subjected him to extreme torture and 18-plus month imprisonment. Openly criticizing the government’s claim that Janko was an enemy combatant despite the evidence showing otherwise, Judge Leon stated that this position “defie[d] common sense”.

According to Judge Leon, “[t]o determine whether a pre-existing relationship [to a terrorist group] sufficiently eroded over a sustained period of time, the Court must, at a minimum, look at the following factors: (1) the nature of the relationship in the first instance; (2) the nature of the intervening events or conduct; and (3) the amount of time that has passed between the time of the pre-existing relationship and the point in time at which the detainee is taken into custody.”

In Janko’s case, Judge Leon declared that “extreme treatment of that nature evinces a total evisceration of whatever relationship might have existed” and “absent proof to the contrary – which is totally lacking here – no remnant of that preexisting relationship appear to have survived.” As a result, the Court found that the government “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Janko was lawfully detainable as an enemy combatant under the AUMF [Authorization for Use of Military Force] at the time he was taken into custody, and the Court must, and will, GRANT his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and order the Government to take all necessary and appropriate diplomatic steps to facilitate his release forthwith.”

Movsesian et al. v. Victoria Versicherung AG et al. (August 20, 2009)

Click here for document (approximately 23 pages)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit recently ruled that Section 354.4 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which extended the statute of limitations until 2010 for claims arising out of life insurance policies issued to Armenian Genocide victims “interfere[d] with the national government’s conduct of foreign relations” and was therefore “preempted.”

The California Legislature had enacted Senate Bill 1915 in 2003, amending California’s Code of Civil Procedure and providing California courts with jurisdiction over certain classes of claims arising out of insurance policies that were held by Armenian Genocide victims, and “extend[ed] the statute of limitations for such claims until December 31, 2010.”

Vazken Movsesian (“Movsesian” or “Plaintiff”) and other class members of Armenian descent, filed a class action against Victoria Verisherung AG (“Victoria”), Ergo Verischerungsgruppe AG (“Ergo”), and Munchener Ruckverischerungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft (“Munich Re”) seeking “damages from all three companies for breach of written contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and other related claims.” Munich Re, the parent company of Victoria and Ergo, filed a motion to dismiss arguing, inter alia, that the class members lacked standing, that Section 354.4 was unconstitutional and that it violated its due process rights. The district court found that the Plaintiffs had standing, rejected the Defendants’ constitutionality and due process arguments, and “held that § 354.4 was not preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine.”

The Court of Appeals was asked to determine “first, whether § 354.4 is preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine; second, whether Munich Re is a proper defendant; and third, whether the Plaintiff-Appellees have standing to bring these claims.” Defendants argued “that § 354.4 is preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine in two ways: first, that it is preempted by the Claims Agreement of 1922, and the War Claims Act of 1928; and second, that it conflicts with the Executive Branch’s policy prohibiting legislative recognition of an ‘Armenian Genocide.’” As evidence for its second argument, Munich Re “point[ed] to several failed House Resolutions… [where] [e]ach time, the Administrations of President Bush and President Clinton took specific action, privately and publicly, to defeat these measures.”

Without analyzing the first argument implicating the Claims Agreement and War Claims Act, the Court held that “§ 354.4 conflicts with Executive Branch foreign policy, and thus, is preempted.”

The Court reviewed the legislative history of the resolutions mentioned and concluded that “[t]he foregoing account of negotiations between the Executive Branch and Congress, and the public statements and letters of two Presidents, clearly establish a presidential foreign policy preference against providing legislative recognition to an “Armenian Genocide.”

Once the Court concluded that there was an executive foreign policy rejecting the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, the Court had to determine whether §354.4 was in conflict with that policy. The Section itself defined Armenian Genocide in words similar to the House Resolutions, a fact the Court found detrimental. The Plaintiffs argued that this subsection could be severed from the remainder of the statute, an argument the Court rejected, holding that the remainder of the law still included the words “Armenian Genocide.”

The Court also noted that the recognition of Armenian Genocide could endanger the nation as a whole and generally undermined the President’s diplomatic authority. And while the states are not prohibited from using the term “Armenian Genocide,” the Court stressed that states could not impede the foreign policy aims of the executive branch.

Prepared by:

• Djurdja Lazic, Esq., Managing Editor International Legal Materials, International Law in Brief (ILIB) and Insights, American Society of International Law
• Maria A. Taurisani, LL.M., ILIB Research Assistant, American Society of International Law